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Abstract: 
Many organizations implement enterprise social media (ESM) in an effort to capture and store valuable knowledge
that employees possess. Unfortunately, more often than not, employees do not make a large number of knowledge
contributions. Using agency theory and contingency theory as foundations, we examine managerial interventions that
can improve knowledge contribution rates in ESM. Specifically, we investigate the individual and joint effects of paying
people to share knowledge, providing social cues, and having supporting and policing moderators on knowledge
sharing. We further examine how two contingency factors—the nature of an employee’s compensation scheme
(variable or fixed) for their primary work task and the employee’s belief about the importance of sharing knowledge—
affect the relative efficacy of the aforementioned managerial interventions. Although we found evidence that being
paid to share knowledge and believing that knowledge sharing is inherently important both increase the amount of
knowledge shared, our most important results concern the existence of significant interaction effects. For persons who
receive a fixed salary, we found a surprisingly large, positive synergistic effect between being paid to share
knowledge and believing that knowledge sharing is important. However, introducing a policing moderator almost
completely nullified this synergistic effect. We discuss the implications of these findings for both practice and
research. 
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1 Introduction 
The phenomenal success of public social media, such as FaceBook, YouTube, Instagram, and Twitter, 
indicates that people are willing to share vast amounts of information with one another in non-work 
settings. Therefore, organizations have unsurprisingly attempted to use social media technologies (e.g., 
wikis, forums, document sharing, and user profiles) included in products such as Jive, Yammer, and 
Chatter to create private social platforms, which we refer to as enterprise social media (ESM), to support 
internal knowledge sharing (Cone, 2007; Marsan, 2011). However, although researchers have called 
social media technologies the “new hope” of knowledge management (Pawlowski et al., 2014), ESM have 
generally failed to meet expectations (Alali & Salim, 2011; Bush & Tiwana, 2005; Chai & Nebus, 2012; 
Milton, 2014). Instead, industry leaders now report the prevalence of “zombie” networks that look alive and 
well but are not actually being used (Denyer, Parry, & Flowers, 2011; Mann, Austin, Drakos, Rozwell, & 
Walls, 2012; Raths, 2015; Wagner, Vollmar, & Wagner, 2014). Our own discussions with ESM community 
managers at several large companies1 indicate that these tools are less successful than expected at 
increasing knowledge sharing in work settings—particularly among employees such as sales people who 
have a variable rather than fixed compensation scheme.  
One possible explanation for why ESM deployments have failed to meet expectations concerns the 
inherent conflict that exists between principals and agents. Agency theory posits that, when one party 
delegates work to another, conflicts in goals frequently exist, and optimal control mechanisms must be 
developed to resolve the conflicts (Eisenhardt, 1989). Managers who act as principals deploy ESM with 
the intention that employees will share their knowledge freely so that the organization may reap the 
benefits of knowledge sharing. But employees already have mandatory, primary tasks to complete on a 
daily basis that historically have not involved or required ESM usage, and so they are likely to view using 
ESM as a voluntary, secondary task. This situation suggests an important misalignment in goals, which 
optimal structuring of incentives may resolve. In this study, we examine the research question: 
RQ: When other work tasks take precedence, what incentives are needed to support knowledge 
sharing in ESM? 
To investigate our research question, we conducted a controlled experiment to isolate key factors that are 
likely to have an impact on knowledge sharing in ESM. 
This paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we review prior literature on motivation and knowledge 
sharing using agency theory as an organizing framework and contingency theory and self-determination 
theory to provide additional insights in that framework. Further, we develop our research hypotheses. In 
Section 3, we describe the research method we used to test the hypotheses. In Section 4, we present our 
results and, in Section 5, discuss their theoretical and practical implications. In Section 6, we conclude the 
paper. 
2 Research Model and Hypotheses 
Prior research on knowledge sharing using ESM suggests that the effectiveness of specific incentives 
varies across different contexts. For example, in the context of non-work social media (e.g., Facebook, 
Twitter), research has found that usage is associated with social factors such as having a sense of 
belonging, strong social ties, a desire to socialize, personal validation, and so on (Chai & Kim, 2012; 
Lampe, Ellison, & Steinfield, 2006; Ma & Agarwal, 2007; Subrahmanyam, Reich, Waechter, & Espinoza, 
2008). Consequently, it is easy to assume that the social features that facilitate interaction in non-work 
social media also would drive knowledge sharing in ESM. However, Ellison, Gibbs, and Weber (2015) 
note that ESM differs from non-work social media on dimensions that include design, audience, and goals 
for use. For example, Facebook affords socialization as an end unto itself, and typical users seek intrinsic 
satisfaction through social interaction. In contrast, an ESM platform commonly facilitates networking 
among colleagues on work topics and discussion and fact finding about specific work tasks. A typical ESM 
user in a work setting seeks to complete work tasks that require the knowledge or help of others. Since 
potential ESM users are focused on completing tasks, social features in ESM platforms may only weakly 
motivate employees to use them and share knowledge unless accompanied by other managerial control 
mechanisms that explicitly signal the need to also focus on knowledge sharing. Indeed, studies of ESM at 
                                                     
1 Private discussions between the first author and social community managers at Wells Fargo and Deloitte. 
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IBM (see DiMicco et al., 2008; DiMicco, Geyer, Millen, Dugan, & Brownholtz, 2009) indicate that the 
presence of social features (e.g., recognition and feedback from peers) drives usage, but research on the 
value of social features in other organizations has found mixed results (Chin, Evans, & Choo, 2015; 
Mettler & Winter, 2015). Perhaps social features made ESM work at IBM because of other factors that 
were also present and, therefore, that a contingency theory perspective is necessary as Huber (2001) 
suggests. 
Another factor that researchers have examined in the context of ESM success is providing financial 
rewards for knowledge sharing. In work settings, financial incentives are very salient influences: they 
represent a leading reason why employees perform prescribed tasks or fulfill assigned responsibilities 
(Bene & Twefik, 2001; DeHoratius & Raman, 2007; Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991). Thus, it is not surprising 
that many studies on the topic of knowledge management have looked at payment as a way to increase 
sharing in knowledge-management systems. This research has found mixed results: some has found a 
positive relationship, others a negative relationship, and still others none at all (Bock, Zmud, Kim, & Lee, 
2005; Cabrera, Collins, & Salgado, 2006; He & Wei, 2009; Kankanhalli, Tan, & Wei, 2005; Lin, 2007; Liu, 
Liang, Rajagopalan, & Sambamurthy, 2011; Mettler & Winter, 2015; Vuori & Okkonen, 2012). These 
differences in outcomes suggest that contextual differences in the studies affected the findings.  
One contextual difference that the aforementioned studies neglected is the impact that payment for the 
primary job has on knowledge sharing. Studies have typically treated knowledge sharing in systems as a 
secondary task or responsibility supported by incremental payments such as bonuses, but they have not 
accounted for the presence of the much larger payments associated with primary job responsibilities. We 
suggest that, in the ESM context, one needs to consider financial incentives for both primary and 
secondary responsibilities (e.g., additional payments for contributing to the ESM) simultaneously to 
understand the impact that they have on each other. 
One also needs to consider the effect of managerial control mechanisms on knowledge sharing because, 
unlike on public social media, ESM often contain sensitive work-related information. As a result, 
organizations are likely to implement controls over ESM in an attempt to mitigate the potential risks 
associated with its use. For example, Lockheed protects the intellectual assets in its private social 
networking platform by paying workers to scan other workers’ employment-related wikis and blogs for 
sensitive material (Messmer, 2009). Other organizations rely on acceptable use policies and software 
rather than humans to police compliance and automatically delete inappropriate materials (Cline, 2008). 
The effect of such organizational controls on knowledge sharing is unclear.  
In summary, we believe that we need to investigate how various incentives (social and financial) interact 
with different types of managerial control mechanisms (type of moderator) and job setting (nature of 
compensation for primary work task) to understand the potential for successfully using ESM as a 
knowledge-sharing platform. However, we must first acknowledge that researchers have demonstrated 
each of the factors we explore to exhibit mixed results in different contexts. Such conflicts in findings are 
not unusual in knowledge-sharing studies, and researchers have suggested that one can resolve such 
conflicts by accounting for how various internal and external incentives interact with one another (Huber, 
2001). Therefore, in addition to testing for the main effects of the identified factors, we also account for the 
influence of internal motivation and for expected interactions among the factors. In the following sections, 
we briefly review agency theory as an organizing framework for our research model and examine 
literature related to our key factors to develop our hypotheses.  
2.1 Agency Theory 
It is possible that the common failure of employees to use ESM to share knowledge reflects a disconnect 
in goals between management and employees. Management expects employees to share their 
knowledge freely, while employees ignore this goal in order to pursue others (Constant, Kiesler, & Sproull, 
1994). Agency theory provides a framework for thinking about situations in which one party, the principal, 
has work expectations of another party, the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). The unit of analysis in these 
relationships is typically a contract that governs the relationship, and the theory focuses on creating the 
most efficient contract possible. It allows one to understand managers as designers of incentive 
mechanisms that lead to desired work outcomes. With respect to the use of ESM for knowledge sharing, 
agency theory suggests that a proper system of incentives can resolve the issues related to employee 
performance and that some systems will be more efficient than others based on incentive costs and 
benefits. 
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One important challenge that exists in developing incentive systems for employees is that managers have 
multiple goals, which results in employees’ having multiple tasks assigned to them (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 
1991). Employees faced with multiple goals set by management are known to only partially fulfill some 
goals and even abandon some entirely in order to pursue a favored goal—particularly when they perceive 
that they have limited capacity to do everything (Schmidt & Dolis, 2009). This need to ration their efforts 
helps to explain why employees that have required tasks to perform as part of their job will not necessarily 
perform an additional, voluntary task such as contributing knowledge to an ESM platform. They are 
already working up to their perceived capacities to perform another goal that has an incentive associated 
with it. The challenge that management faces is how to encourage employees to share knowledge without 
negatively impacting employee performance on a primary task. In this section, we develop a theoretical 
model that captures critical elements to developing an incentive system to share knowledge in ESM in a 
dual-goal working environment whose goals involve completing primary work tasks and sharing 
knowledge in ESM. 
Managers who seek to direct employee activity in the workplace, such as to share knowledge, need to 
consider what motivates employees. Extrinsic motivation and internalized extrinsic motivation are two 
important forms of motivation that managers can manipulate in a workplace setting (Ryan & Deci, 2000b). 
Internalized extrinsic motivation refers to socially derived values and beliefs that an individual holds that 
influence behavior (Ryan & Deci, 2000b). Internalized extrinsic motivation is characterized by an 
individual’s having a mindset that a particular behavior is valuable, useful, or “the right thing to do" (Deci & 
Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2000a, 2000b). For example, Wasko and Faraj (2000) studied online technical 
forums and found that some people shared knowledge not because of any inherent pleasure but because 
they thought it would help others and because helping others was the “right thing to do”. Similarly, studies 
in work contexts have found that believing knowledge sharing has value increases knowledge-sharing 
behavior (Bock et al., 2005; Bock & Kim, 2002; Coakes, 2004; Lin, 2007).  
By influencing an organization’s culture, managers can influence the extent to which employees believe 
that knowledge sharing is important (Constant et al., 1994). Based on the preceding discussion, we 
predict that employees who believe that knowledge sharing is important are more likely to share 
knowledge without any overt managerial intervention to have them do so than people who do not share 
this belief. As such, we hypothesize: 
H1: Individuals who believe that sharing knowledge is important make more contributions to ESM 
than individuals who do not.  
The failure of ESM and other forms of knowledge-management systems to meet expectations for 
knowledge sharing suggests that internalized extrinsic motivation alone is not sufficient. Managers need to 
provide extrinsic incentives to motivate the desired behavior. Extrinsic rewards need not be financial. As 
we discuss above, people share lots of information in public social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube. Although some users of public social media make contributions with the goal of being 
compensated financially, most users do not expect payment and instead are motivated by social 
incentives. Prior research has found that social incentives often increase knowledge sharing in work 
environments and non-work environments (Bock et al., 2005; Chiu, Hsu, & Wang, 2006; DiMicco et al., 
2008; Han & Anantatmula, 2007; Hsu, Ju, Yen, & Chang, 2007; Ma & Agarwal, 2007; Marett & Joshi, 
2009).  
A feature that seems to be ubiquitous across public social media is the ability to react to contributions 
using “like” or “dislike” signals. Apparently, such a capability satisfies an innate desire to connect with 
others in order to receive recognition and feedback (Barker, 2009; DiMicco et al., 2008; Lin & Lu, 2011; 
Markus, Manville, & Agres, 2000; Raacke & Raacke, 2008; Rheingold, 1993). Attempts to increase 
knowledge sharing by incorporating features and tools found in public social media should, at a minimum, 
include mechanisms to make both contributions and feedback on those contributions visible. As such, we 
hypothesize: 
H2: The presence of social feedback cues that publically display reactions to contributions increase 
knowledge sharing in ESM. 
Another decision that managers face concerns whether to incorporate human moderators in ESM. Human 
moderators may be tasked to generate discussion, filter content, and/or maintain civility among users 
(Hummel & Lechner, 2002; Lazar & Preece, 2002; Phang, Kankanhalli, & Sabherwal, 2009; Preece, 
2000). They also can be tasked with corporate surveillance as reflected by the fact that over 60 percent of 
companies monitor employee communications through means that include recording phone calls and 
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reviewing email messages (Selnow & Gilbert, 1997). Organizations justify such surveillance as a means of 
ensuring ethical behaviors (Lindsay, Lindsay, & Irvine, 1996; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999) and protecting  
sensitive data from leaking (Lawton, 2008; Papadimitriou & Garcia-Molina, 2011).  
Regardless of the justification for using human moderators, their impact on knowledge sharing depends 
on the potential contributor’s perception of the moderator’s role and purpose (Durcikova & Gray, 2009). 
One possibility is to view the moderator’s role as that of a supportive coach whose purpose is to 
encourage people to make contributions, offer support in making contributions, and review contributions in 
constructive and open ways. Preece (2001, 2004) argues that the presence of such a nurturing moderator 
should increase the number of contributions that each member of an online community makes. Phang et 
al. (2009) empirically verified these arguments in finding that the level of interaction and sharing increased 
when moderators in an online discussion forum were perceived as encouraging and friendly.  
However, tone can also view human moderators as playing the role of “knowledge management police” 
whose purpose is to ensure adherence to policies and rules by monitoring online activities for events such 
as ethical violations or disclosure of sensitive information that merit corrective intervention or even 
punishment. The possibility of punishment, whether or not actually administered, is a distinguishing 
characteristic of policing moderators. In a working context, punishment could be as minor as eliminating 
low-quality or duplicate postings (which causes the individuals to have wasted their effort in making the 
contribution) or as serious as terminating the employee because of unethical behavior or disclosure of 
sensitive information.  
The potential impact of viewing a moderator as a policing authority can be understood through the lens of 
deterrence theory. Deterrence theory is based on the perspective that people make reasoned decisions 
regarding a behavior based on perceptions of its costs and benefits (D’Arcy & Herath, 2011). For 
example, behavioral research on information security has found evidence that the threat of detection and 
punishment deters employees from violating policy (D’Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2009; Herath & Rao, 
2009a, 2009b; Siponen, Willison, & Baskerville, 2008; Straub, 1990). Indeed, the mere presence of a 
sanctioning system makes the cost of violating a policy, whether intentional or unintentional, more salient 
and serves as a deterrent to undesirable behavior (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). 
Research has also found intense monitoring to demotivate people and reduce effort (Barkema, 1995). In 
addition, some evidence suggests that the threat of possible sanctions reduces work output (Fehr & 
Schmidt, 2007). Thus, the presence of a policing moderator may increase the perceived cost of 
knowledge sharing (wasted effort, reprimand, or punishment) and, hence, discourage people from taking 
the time to share knowledge. As such, we hypothesize: 
H3a: The presence of a supportive moderator increases knowledge sharing in ESM. 
H3b: The presence of a policing moderator decreases knowledge sharing in ESM. 
2.2 Contingency Theory 
Contingency theory argues that no single, best way to make decisions exists. Instead, the best course of 
action depends on specific contextual factors that affect the relationships between independent and 
dependent variables (Donaldson, 2001; Drazin & Van de Ven 1985; Hollenbeck et al., 2002; Islam & Hu, 
2012). When choosing among competing tasks, many factors contribute to the choice an employee 
makes, such as the relative difficulty of the tasks, ability relative to the tasks, magnitude of tasks, feedback 
regarding task performance, peer pressure, and risk aversion; however, income expectation is likely to be 
paramount when present (Bene & Twefik, 2001; Caraco, 1980; DeHoratius & Raman, 2007; DeShon, 
Kozlowski, Schmidt, Milner, & Wiechmann, 2004; Northcraft, Schmidt, & Ashford, 2011; Schmidt, Dolis, & 
Tolli, 2009; Schmidt & DeShon, 2007; Schmidt & Dolis, 2009; Son & Metcalfe, 2000). Therefore, tasks 
with a greater income expectation (i.e., primary responsibility tasks) will receive more attention than those 
with little or no income expectation (i.e., voluntary or secondary responsibility tasks), which implies that 
the payment attached to the completion of primary tasks in a work setting may impact the completion of 
secondary tasks.  
Further, the type of compensation that an organization offers for a primary task may also affect this 
relationship. The two basic compensation options that employers use are: 1) pay a fixed salary or 2) pay a 
variable (piece-rate) amount tied to output. A fixed salary provides a weaker link between pay and 
performance than does a variable or piece-rate compensation plan (Stajkovic & Luthans, 2001) because it 
implies that, as long as output exceeds a level deemed “satisfactory”, pay is not affected, which 
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constitutes one reason why workers who operate under piece-rate incentive schemes tend to have higher 
task-performance levels than salaried workers (Lazear, 2000). Piece-rate compensation schemes cause 
people to constantly think in terms of economic rationality when considering task choice. Doing anything 
other than the task that generates rewarded output reduces compensation.  
Sharing knowledge takes time away from one’s primary task. As such, for piece-rate workers, sharing 
knowledge reduces output and, thereby, expected income. Thus, piece-rate workers who take time to 
share their knowledge will suffer a reduction in total remuneration. In contrast, salaried workers are likely 
to incur little, if any, financial penalty for sharing knowledge in ESM. As long they do not spend so much 
time sharing knowledge that they fail to complete their primary tasks, they will receive their normal 
compensation. As such, we hypothesize: 
H4:  People paid a fixed salary for their primary work task make more knowledge contributions 
using ESM than people paid on a piece-rate basis for their primary work task. 
In addition to having a main effect on knowledge sharing, a worker’s compensation scheme for a primary 
work task will also likely affect how the worker responds to various combinations of other motivations to 
share knowledge. One obvious extrinsic motivator that managers can use to increase knowledge sharing 
is a financial reward for contributions to the knowledge repository. Generally speaking, workers are 
economically rational and tend to concentrate their effort on tasks for which they are financially 
compensated (Bene & Twefik, 2001; DeHoratius & Raman, 2007). In practice, economic rationality means 
that employees will tend to do what they get paid to do.  
This phenomenon extends beyond their primary tasks and applies to potential secondary tasks as well. 
For example, research has shown that offering monetary compensation increases participation in training 
and development activities (Maurer & Tarulli, 1994). Thus, even when employees are already paid for a 
primary job, one can incentivize them to do other tasks as well by offering them monetary payment. Thus, 
it comes as no surprise that many firms have attempted to increase knowledge sharing through payments 
that are above and beyond the employee’s primary compensation.  
Surprisingly, prior research on the effect of financial rewards on knowledge sharing has found mixed 
results. Some studies have found evidence that paying people to share knowledge is effective (Cabrera et 
al., 2006; Kankanhalli et al., 2005; Liu et al., 2011), while others have reported that financial incentives do 
not increase knowledge sharing (Bock et al., 2005; He & Wei, 2009; Lin, 2007). This pattern of mixed 
results suggests that other contextual factors are at play in organizational settings (Marett & Joshi, 2009). 
One potentially important factor is the nature of the employee’s primary compensation scheme. If we 
consider the effect of offering piece-rate workers a financial incentive to share knowledge, the financial 
incentive will most likely be lower than the reward for performing their primary task. Therefore, it still is 
economically irrational to share knowledge, which may explain why sales people and other types of 
workers who are compensated on a piece-rate basis are hesitant to spend time on secondary tasks 
(Davey, 2011). In contrast, offering a salaried person a token payment to share knowledge is a “carrot” 
that increases their total remuneration. As such, we hypothesize: 
H5: Paying people to share knowledge using ESM increases the quantity of knowledge 
contributions for salaried workers but not for piece-rate workers. 
2.3 Self-determination Theory 
One can use self-determination theory (SDT) with contingency theory to better understand why the 
compensation scheme for the primary work task likely interacts with various other motivators for sharing 
knowledge. According to (SDT), human beings have basic needs that, when met, increase motivation but, 
when undermined, decrease motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000b). SDT posits that external incentives can 
either increase (called “crowding in”) or decrease (called “crowding out”) the preexisting level of internal 
motivation (Frey & Jegen, 2001). 
Several studies have empirically demonstrated the behavioral impact of crowding effects (Frey & Jegen, 
2001; Heyman & Ariely, 2004). Sometimes external incentives increase overall activity levels on tasks, 
while other times they decrease them. The effect depends on how individuals perceive the external 
incentives (Frey & Jegen, 2001). If individuals consider an external incentive to complement their existing 
internal motivations, the external incentive “crowds in” or enhances that motivation; conversely, if they 
perceive the external incentive as an attempt to control behavior and diminish free will, the external 
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incentive “crowds out” or reduces the pre-existing level of motivation (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; Frey 
& Obeholzer-Gee, 1997; Osterloh & Frey, 2000).  
The situational context affects how a person perceives an extrinsic motivator (Donaldson, 2001; Drazin & 
Van de Ven, 1985; Hollenbeck et al., 2002). Specifically, the nature of an employee’s compensation 
scheme for performing their primary work task will likely influence how they perceive the value of being 
paid to share knowledge (a secondary task). As we explain above, knowledge sharing is economically 
irrational for piece-rate workers because it will reduce their earnings. Nevertheless, piece-rate workers 
may share knowledge if their internal motivation is strong enough that they are willing to make some 
sacrifice in order to do something they value (Deci & Ryan, 2000a, 2000b). However, offering a piece-rate 
worker a financial incentive to share knowledge may remind the piece-rate worker that they will suffer an 
economic penalty for taking time to share knowledge. Consequently, workers may perceive a token 
payment for sharing knowledge as an attempt to control their behavior—in essence, a “bribe” to make 
them act against their self-interest. Thus, offering to pay piece-rate workers to share knowledge may 
“crowd out” any pre-existing disposition to do so.  
In contrast, offering salaried workers a token payment to share knowledge will not decrease their total 
remuneration. Thus, salaried workers may be more likely to perceive payments for knowledge sharing as 
“informing” them about the value of their efforts rather than an attempt to coerce their behavior. 
Accordingly, paying salaried workers to share knowledge should “crowd in” any pre-existing internal 
motivation to do so. As such, we hypothesize a three-way interaction between primary compensation 
scheme, financial incentives to share knowledge, and internal beliefs about the importance of sharing 
knowledge: 
H6a:  For salaried workers, the combined effect of being paid to share knowledge and believing 
that knowledge sharing is important will be greater than the sum of the individual effects (i.e., 
there will be a positive synergistic effect).  
H6b:  For piece-rate workers, the combined effect of being paid to share knowledge and believing 
that knowledge sharing is important will be less than the sum of the individual effects (i.e., 
there will be a negative synergistic effect).  
Another important finding of motivation-crowding research is that multiple sources of motivation may either 
complement (crowd in) or counteract (crowd out) one another (Ariely, Bracha, & Meier, 2009; Heyman & 
Ariely, 2004). Because any factor that introduces feelings of control can crowd out internal motivation, the 
existence of even one controlling factor could potentially undermine the benefits of multiple other factors. 
Recall that, in H3a and H3b, we hypothesize that a supportive moderator should increase (decrease) 
knowledge sharing because workers will perceive the moderator as trying to help (as trying to control 
behavior). Thus, the presence of a policing moderator could undermine a situation that would otherwise 
be conducive to knowledge sharing. As such, we hypothesize a four-way interaction between primary 
compensation scheme, paying to share knowledge, internal beliefs about the importance of knowledge 
sharing, and the presence of a policing moderator: 
H7: The presence of a policing moderator undermines the effect of offering payments for 
knowledge sharing to salaried workers who believe knowledge sharing is important.  
2.4 Research Model 
Figure 1 summarizes our research model and hypotheses. It highlights the fact that knowledge sharing 
depends on internal and external factors and that those factors interact with each other. We use separate 
models for salaried and piece-rate workers because we hypothesize that the effects on knowledge sharing 
will differ depending on the nature of the compensation scheme for an employee’s primary task. 
Therefore, H4 does not explicitly appear in Figure 1 but is reflected in the differences between the two 
halves of the model.  
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Piece-Rate Model      Salaried Model 
Figure 1. Research Model and Hypotheses
3 Methodology 
Prior research primarily has used field studies to investigate the factors that influence knowledge sharing. 
Although field studies possess the advantage of investigating the behavior in its natural setting, they 
typically do not permit one to comprehensively test how various manipulated factors interact with one 
another. Moreover, field studies create several potential threats to internal validity (Cook & Campbell, 
1979) because managers may justifiably encourage employees to respond to unanticipated events 
affecting the enterprise’s future (loss or gain of an important customer, budget crises, macroeconomic 
factors affecting revenues or costs, mergers or acquisitions, etc.) in a manner that would confound the 
desired experimental manipulations.  
In addition, it is difficult in an organizational setting to prevent participants who receive different 
experimental treatments from comparing notes or even providing friends and colleagues the opportunity to 
access what they perceive as a useful tool. We used a controlled laboratory experiment so that we could 
investigate the direct and joint effects on knowledge sharing of extrinsic incentives (payment for 
knowledge sharing and social feedback cues), internal motivation, presence and type of moderator, and 
nature of compensation scheme for primary task. By using a controlled experiment, we could also 
eliminate the fear of job loss, which research has shown to inhibit knowledge sharing (Gray, 2001), as a 
potential confounding factor. We conducted several rounds of pilot testing to refine the details of the 
experimental task and nature of the treatment conditions. 
Our research model posits that several internal and extrinsic motivational factors affect whether an 
employee chooses to share information using ESM. However, we believe that those factors will affect 
workers paid on a salary basis differently than workers paid on a piece-rate basis. Because there are so 
many interactions between the type of compensation scheme and the other relevant experimental 
variables (social cues, payment for knowledge sharing, type of moderator) and the observational variable 
(belief that knowledge sharing is important) and because we had enough observations to estimate 
separate models for subjects paid a fixed salary and subjects paid a piece-rate, we estimated two models. 
Running the models separately eliminates the need to assume that the variance of the error term is the 
same for both models (which probably is not true in this case) and the need to create an interaction 
between compensation scheme and every other independent variable and between compensation 
scheme and every identified interaction among the other independent variables (Kmenta, 1971; Neter, 
Wasserman, & Kutner, 1989). Running the models separately makes it easier to interpret coefficient 
estimates, especially when one has three or four-way interaction terms, and constitutes the main reason 
why researchers so commonly use split sample regressions.  
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3.1 Experimental Task 
The primary work task required participants to search the Internet to retrieve information of several types, 
including finance and technology (see Appendix A, Figure A6, for an example of the information retrieval 
task screen). A website we created for the primary task listed the information that participants were to 
retrieve and provided a place where participants could record that information2. We designed the primary 
task website to function as a private online document, so only the participant who recorded the retrieved 
information items for the primary task could see them. This design prevented participants from simply 
copying someone else’s work. 
We created a separate website for the secondary task of knowledge sharing. The knowledge-sharing 
website prominently featured a discussion area that we pre-configured with categories related to the work 
tasks. In the knowledge-sharing website, all participants could see both the shared knowledge and the 
comments on the shared knowledge. 
3.2 Experimental Design and Variables 
We used a 2 x 2 x 2 x 3 analysis of covariance design to test the hypotheses. We randomly assigned 
participants to each of the 24 treatment combinations. The first manipulated factor was primary task 
compensation scheme: we informed half of the participants that they would be paid a fixed salary of 
$30.00 in game money provided that they completed at least one task; we told the other half that they 
would earn $1.00 in game money for each task they completed. The second manipulated factor was the 
presence or absence of financial incentives to share knowledge. We told half of the salaried subjects that 
they would earn an additional 25 cents in game money if they posted one or more items in the community 
knowledge-sharing website, and we told half of the piece-rate workers that they would earn $0.01 in game 
money for each knowledge contribution. We told the other subjects that they would not be paid for making 
knowledge contributions. To be realistic, we deliberately set the payment amount for making a knowledge 
contribution to be markedly lower than what would be earned for performing the primary task (1% of 
primary compensation in the case of piece-rate workers, and .83% of primary compensation in the case of 
salaried workers). 
The third manipulated factor was whether social feedback cues were present or absent. We assigned half 
of the participants to an experimental treatment that appeared to allow them to make comments on the 
posts of other participants and see feedback comments made in response to knowledge postings created 
by themselves and others in the community knowledge-sharing website. The other half could neither see 
nor post any feedback comments on knowledge postings in the community knowledge-sharing website 
(see Appendix A, Table A6, for an example screenshot of the knowledge-sharing task screen).  
To ensure that participants assigned to the social cues feedback condition were not subject to flaming and 
did not become involved in extended interactions with other participants, the community knowledge-
sharing website did not display the knowledge contributions and feedback comments of other participants 
but rather displayed: 1) system-generated knowledge contributions designed to appear like other 
participants in the room posted them, 2) favorable feedback comments about the individual’s knowledge 
postings that appeared to be from the other participants but were actually system generated, and 3) a 
fictitious view counter that indicated how often the individual’s knowledge posts were read, which the 
system periodically increased to provide the appearance of an active social community.  
Thus, participants in the social cues feedback treatment saw only their own knowledge posts, their own 
feedback comments on system-generated knowledge posts, and the system-generated knowledge posts 
and feedback comments; they did not see the knowledge posts or feedback comments from other 
participants in the study and could not interact with other participants in the study. Moreover, individuals 
who were not in the social cues feedback treatment saw only their knowledge posts and system-
generated knowledge posts. Showing only system-generated knowledge posts not only prevented 
unwanted side effects (e.g., flaming) but also allowed us to limit the amount of knowledge entered to a 
small quantity, so participants would not feel that others had already posted all of the useful information.  
                                                     
2 Pilot testing indicated that one could retrieve the required information about a company in approximately 30 seconds. Thus, we 
expected the total remuneration for the salaried and piece-rate workers to be about the same. Moreover, the salaried participants 
had plenty of time to not only earn their fixed salary but also share knowledge if they so desired.  
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The fourth manipulated factor, nature of the human moderator, had three levels: none, supportive, or 
policing. We informed participants in the supportive moderator treatment of the presence of a human 
moderator who could help them improve a post’s clarity and usefulness. We informed participants in the 
policing moderator treatment of the presence of a moderator who monitored contributions to ensure that 
they were not inappropriate or offensive but who would also fine the contributor for each item that the 
moderator had to remove from the knowledge repository. The fine was one dollar in game money for each 
item that the moderator removed. The amount of the fine was set at approximately three percent of the 
total expected remuneration for both salaried and piece-rate workers in order to make it salient.  
In addition to the four experimental factors, we also had one observational factor: each participant’s belief 
about the importance of sharing knowledge. Research has demonstrated the belief that knowledge 
sharing has value to an organization to increase knowledge sharing in work contexts (Constant et al., 
1994). We collected this data after completion of the experiment as part of the debriefing survey (see 
Appendix A, Table A9, part 1) in order to avoid sensitizing participants about the value of knowledge 
sharing and, thereby, biasing our results. We classified each participant as either believing knowledge 
sharing is more important than the primary task or not believing knowledge sharing is more important than 
the primary task. 
Because we measured participants’ beliefs about the importance of sharing knowledge after the 
experiment concluded, one or more of the manipulated variables could have possibly affected such 
beliefs. In fact, a key tenet of motivation crowding theory is that extrinsic incentives can either increase 
(crowd in) or decrease (crowd out) pre-existing internal motivation (Deci et al., 1999; Frey & Jegen, 2001; 
Frey & Obeholzer-Gee, 1997; Osterloh & Frey, 2000). In Section 4, we explain how we tested whether 
any of our manipulations affected participants’ beliefs about the importance of knowledge sharing.  
The dependent variable for our study was the number of knowledge contributions that participants made. 
The system automatically recorded this information whenever a participant made an entry on the 
knowledge-sharing website. 
3.3 Participants 
We recruited 1,410 students in a required business course offered at a major university in the 
southwestern United States to participate in the experiment. We compensated them with a small amount 
of extra credit for their participation. In all, 1,222 of the subjects completed the experiment. The 188 
students that began but did not complete the experiment either stopped working because their computer 
ran out of power or failed to complete one of the required steps such as the exit survey. 
Researchers have intensely debated the use of students as subjects in experiments for years. Compeau, 
Marcolin, Kelley, and Higgins (2012) summarize the discussion and present guidelines for determining 
when the use of students is appropriate. We think that this study satisfies their conditions. First, we 
examine whether specific manipulations (type of primary compensation scheme, payment for sharing 
knowledge, absence/presence of social feedback cues, and type of moderator) affect knowledge sharing. 
A laboratory experiment provides the strongest means of testing for such effects while controlling for 
possible confounding factors.  
Second, the use of students provides the strongest possible test of whether social feedback cues and the 
type of moderator affect knowledge sharing. Pew Research has found that adults from 18-29 years of age 
and those with at least some college use social networking websites the most (Pew Research Center, 
2017). Thus, students are accustomed to the presence of a variety of social feedback cues (e.g., 
information about the number of “likes” for a post along with evaluative comments) when using social 
networks; and would be more likely to notice the absence of such features than would people who use 
social networks less extensively. If the absence of social feedback cues does not adversely affect 
undergraduate students, it is not likely to affect older workers in organizations.  
Further, research has found evidence that students are more likely to comply with authority than older 
workers (Sears, 1986), which may reflect the fact that they constantly receive feedback from their 
instructors. Therefore, students are more likely to notice and react to the presence of moderators. 
Consequently, students may exhibit a larger positive reaction to the presence of a supportive moderator 
and be less negatively affected by a policing moderator’s presence than older workers, which suggests 
that moderators may have a larger positive impact (in the case of a supporting moderator) and a lesser 
negative impact (in the case of a policing moderator) on knowledge sharing by students than by older 
workers. Thus, as with social feedback cues, using students as subjects in a controlled laboratory 
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experiment provides a strong test of whether the experimental manipulation (presence of moderator and 
type of moderator) affects knowledge sharing in the work environment.  
Testing whether something can happen, even in a laboratory experiment, is an important step in 
understanding many phenomena (Mook, 1983). In particular, if a generally held belief (hypothesis) does 
not hold in a laboratory experiment, then, provided the experiment is internally valid, the theory underlying 
that hypothesis needs to be revised. Thus, our using students in our laboratory experiment provided an 
economical way to determine whether researchers who conduct field studies on knowledge sharing using 
ESM in actual work environments need to further consider two potential non-financial incentives (social 
feedback cues and moderators). 
3.4 Procedures 
We randomly assigned participants to one of the experimental conditions. The experiment took place in a 
large room that seated over 350 people. Participants brought or we loaned them laptops with Internet 
access. At the beginning of the experiment, we read a script that explained the task (see Appendix B). We 
then showed the participants the two websites that they would use on projection screens at the front of the 
room: one website for performing work tasks and another website for sharing knowledge related to the 
work tasks. We then showed them how to access and interact with each of the websites. 
We first asked subjects to register to use the social media website that we created specifically for this 
experiment. This step required them to create a personal profile that contained information such as their 
name, gender, hobbies, major, and so on. The system assigned them randomly to one of 24 different 
treatment combinations. They then read the appropriate treatment scenario informing them 1) how they 
would be paid for the primary task (salary or piece-rate), 2) whether or not they would be paid for sharing 
knowledge, 3) whether anyone else could see and respond to any contributions they posted on the 
knowledge-sharing website, and 4) whether the knowledge base forum would be moderated and, if so, the 
type of moderator (policing or supporting). Appendix C shows the scenarios. 
After reading the scenario, participants had to pass a quiz to demonstrate that they understood it correctly 
(i.e., that they understood how they were being paid, whether they would be compensated for sharing 
knowledge, etc.). We gave them unlimited chances to take the quiz but they had to re-read the scenario 
each time they failed to pass it. When everyone had passed the quiz, we simultaneously gave all 
participants a start code that allowed them to access the work task and knowledge-sharing websites. 
We gave participants 20 minutes to complete the experiment. Pilot testing indicated that a person could 
complete a primary task (e.g., find a required piece of information for one company) in about 30 seconds. 
Thus, participants had sufficient time to allocate to sharing their knowledge if they so desired. After 20 
minutes, we asked participants to stop working and complete an exit survey (Appendix A, Tables A9 and 
A10). We then read a debriefing script to them (see end of Appendix B). 
4 Results 
Technical difficulties (e.g., loss of power to devices, incompatible browser settings, failure to pay attention 
to directions, etc.) caused 164 people to begin the experiment late, which meant they had less time to 
perform tasks than the others. Because tests indicated that whether a person started on time or not had 
both a main effect on knowledge contributions and significantly interacted with the independent variables, 
we did not include subjects that started late in the analyses we used to test our hypotheses. We also 
eliminated another 290 participants because they incorrectly answered one or more manipulation check 
questions in the exit survey (e.g., incorrectly recalled whether they were paid to share knowledge, etc.)3. 
We also removed one additional participant who was paid piece-rate and appeared to have tried to game 
the results by posting every task accomplished as a knowledge contribution. Thus, the results we report 
are based on 767 participants.  
Table 1 shows that the participants were, on average, 18.8 years’ old and that 56 percent were male. On 
average, participants completed nearly 31 primary tasks. Thirty percent of participants made at least one 
knowledge contribution; of those who did, the average number of contributions was 3.1. In the post-
                                                     
3 Results were similar for analyses that included the 290 participants who answered one or more exit survey questions incorrectly, 
but, to be conservative, in our tests, we present the results for only the participants who passed all manipulation checks. 
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experiment debriefing, 22 percent of respondents indicated that they thought the knowledge contribution 
task was more important than the primary task, which shows that a sizeable number of respondents were 
internally motivated to share knowledge.  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Standard deviation Sample size 
Age 18.81 2.34 767 
Sex (0 = female, 1 = male) .56 .50 767 
Primary tasks completed 30.77 19.97 767 
Knowledge tasks completed (all) .92 2.54 767 
Knowledge tasks completed (those who contributed) 3.07 3.87 229 
Believe knowledge sharing is important (0 = no, 1 = yes) .22 .42 767 
4.1 Manipulation Checks 
As we explain above, we conducted our analyses only on participants who, during the post-experiment 
debriefing, indicated that they correctly understood what treatments they had received. In addition, during 
the debriefing, we explained that, to ensure that everyone received the same type and quantity of periodic 
social feedback, the system would display information about the number of times people had viewed a 
contribution and post evaluative statements about those contributions. Oral comments from participants 
during the debriefing indicated they were surprised to learn that the feedback came from a computer, 
which suggests that the social cues were realistic. Furthermore, those participants whom we told would 
receive piece-rate compensation for the primary task completed more work tasks than did participants 
whom we told would be paid a fixed salary (33.9 versus 27.6, respectively, p < .001, 95% confidence limits 
for difference are 3.5 to 9.1), which indicates that our manipulation of the primary task compensation 
scheme was salient and affected participants’ behaviors.  
4.2 Determinants of Knowledge Sharing 
In each compensation scheme, we used regression analysis to test the effects of the experimental 
treatments on knowledge sharing using ESM. To simplify interpretation of the regression results, we 
coded belief that knowledge sharing is important (KSI), payment to share knowledge (PSK), social 
feedback cues (SOC), and being paid a salary (SAL) as a binary: 1 indicated that the factor was present, 
and 0 indicated that it was not. We also created two dummy variables to represent the presence 
(absence) of a supportive moderator (SM) or a policing moderator (PM). Tables 2 and 3 display the results 
for both salaried and piece-rate treatments.  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
 B Std. error t-value p-value 95% C.L. 
Constant .240 .340 .706 .481 -.43 to .91 
KSI (H1) 1.354 .484 2.798 .005 .40 to 2.30 
SOC (H2) -.254 .295 -.861 .390 -.84 to .33 
SM (H3a) .258 .360 .715 .475 -.46 to .97 
PM (H3b) .215 .382 .563 .574 -.54 to .97 
PSK (H5) .822 .347 2.369 .018 .14 to 1.50 
PSK*KSI (H6a) 2.884 .743 3.882 .000 1.42 to 4.34 
PSK*KSI*PM (H7) -2.851 .875 -3.259 .001 -4.57 to -1.13
n = 379, adjusted R square = .186, F = 13.339, p-value = .000 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
 B Std. error t-value p-value 95% C.L. 
Constant .353 .189 1.865 .063 -.02 to .72 
KSI (H1) 1.071 .308 3.478 .001 .47 to 1.68 
SOC (H2) -.266 .164 -1.624 .105 -.59 to .06 
SM (H3a) .054 .198 .271 .786 -.34 to .44 
PM (H3b) -.075 .198 -.379 .705 -.46 to .32 
PSK (H5) .402 .181 2.218 .027 .05 to .76 
PSK*KSI (H6b) -.218 .419 -.520 .603 -1.04 to .61 
n = 388, adjusted R square = .056, F = 4.845, p-value = .000 
4.3 Hypothesis Tests 
Tables 2 and 3 display the p-values for the tests of all our hypotheses except H4, which we discuss after. 
H1 posits that people who believe that knowledge sharing is important (KSI) make more knowledge 
contributions using ESM than those who do not share that belief. As Tables 2 and 3 show, the main effect 
for KSI was positive and significant as H1 posits. As we expected, both piece-rate and salaried workers 
made more contributions when they believed knowledge sharing is important. Moreover, the low p-values 
for the tests were not simply an artifact of the relatively large sample sizes. The average amount of 
knowledge sharing for the two groups was 0.60 for the piece-rate group and 1.25 for the salary group. The 
magnitudes of the point estimates for the effect of believing that knowledge sharing is important were 
1.071 and 1.354, respectively, which indicates more than a doubling of the quantity of knowledge sharing 
for both groups. This situation is not one where the result is statistically significant but of no practical 
importance.  
H2 posits that the presence of social feedback cues (SOC) increases knowledge sharing using ESM. 
Tables 2 and 3 show that the coefficient for SOC was not significant and even that it had the wrong sign 
for both salaried and piece-rate workers. Thus, the results indicate that social cues do not appear to 
provide any incentive to share knowledge. 
H3a and H3b posit that the presence of a supportive (policing) moderator (SM and PM, respectively) 
increases (decreases) knowledge sharing. Tables 2 and 3 show that the coefficients for SM and PM were 
not even close to being significant for either salaried or piece-rate workers. Thus, the results indicate that 
human moderators do not appear to provide any direct incentive or disincentive to share knowledge.  
H5 posits that paying people to share knowledge (PSK) increases the quantity of knowledge contributions 
for salaried workers but not for piece-rate workers. Tables 2 and 3 show that the coefficient for PSK was 
significant for both salaried and piece-rate workers. As we point out above, the average amount of 
knowledge sharing for the two groups was 0.60 for the piece-rate group and 1.25 for the salary group. The 
magnitudes of the point estimates for the effect of being paid to share knowledge were 0.402 for the 
piece-rate group and 0.822 for the salaried group—a more than a 50 percent increase in the quantity of 
knowledge sharing for both groups. This result is statistically significant and practically important. Thus, 
the results only partially agree with our expectations since being paid to share knowledge had an effect on 
knowledge sharing not only for participants in the salaried treatment but also for those in the piece-rate 
treatment. 
H6a posits a positive synergistic effect between being paid to share knowledge (PSK) and the belief that 
knowledge sharing is important (KSI) for salaried workers, and H6b posits a negative synergistic effect 
between PSK and KSI for piece-rate workers. For salaried workers, Table 2 shows a large and statistically 
significant effect (p = .000). Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficient for PSK*KSI (2.884) was more than 
twice the average amount of knowledge sharing (1.25), which indicates that the effect is practically 
important and statistically significant. In contrast, for piece-rate workers, Table 3 shows no synergy 
between PSK and KSI (p = .603). Thus, the results agree with our expectations for H6a but not for H6b. 
H7 posits that, for salaried workers, the presence of a policing moderator (PM) undermines the positive 
effects of workers’ believing that knowledge sharing is important (KSI) and paying workers to share 
knowledge (PSK). Table 2 shows that the results concur with this hypothesis (p = .001). The coefficient for 
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PSK*KSI*PM (-2.851) had almost the same magnitude as the coefficient for PSK*KSI (2.884) but the 
opposite sign. Thus, our results indicate that the presence of a policing moderator almost completely 
nullifies the synergy between PSK and KSI.  
Note also that, in Tables 2 and 3, the constant term was not significant at the 0.05 level for either salaried 
(p = .481) or piece-rate workers (p = .063). Although we made no hypothesis about the constant term, we 
can reasonably expect that, if workers do not feel knowledge sharing is important and do not receive any 
external incentives to share knowledge (the subjects in the baseline category), then they will not share 
any knowledge. The non-significance of the constant term confirms this expectation. 
H4 posits that people paid a fixed salary for their primary work task make more knowledge contributions 
using ESM than people paid on a piece-rate basis. Because Table 2 reports separate results for the 
salaried and piece-rate treatment groups, it does not contain a test for hypothesis H4. To test H4, we ran 
an independent groups t-test that did not assume equal variances for the two groups. Because we 
randomly assigned subjects to the two groups, the assumptions for this test were satisfied. The mean and 
standard deviation for the salaried group were 1.25 and 3.169, respectively. The mean and standard 
deviation for the piece-rate group were .60 and 1.651, respectively. The p-value for the test of the 
difference between the means was p < .001, and the 95 percent confidence limits for the difference were 
.293 to 1.012. Because belief that knowledge sharing is an observational variable rather than an 
experimental variable (and, hence, could differ for the two groups), we also ran a regression analysis with 
knowledge contributions as the dependent variable and compensation scheme and belief that knowledge 
sharing is important as the independent variables. Table 4 shows the results. 
In Table 4, the 95 percent confidence limits for the difference in knowledge sharing due to the 
compensation scheme were .180 to .867 rather than .293 to 1.012. This shift arose due to the fact that a 
higher percent of the persons in the paid salary group (versus the paid piece-rate group) believed that 
knowledge sharing is important. Part of the difference in knowledge sharing between the two groups arose 
due to the difference in the percent of the number of people who believed knowledge sharing is important.  
Table 4. Regression Results for Piece-rate versus Salary Workers 
 B Std. error t-value p-value 95% C.I. 
Constant .263 .129 2.045 .041 .011 to .515 
KSI (H1) 1.767 .209 8.436 .000 1.356 to 2.178
SAL (H4) .524 .175 2.996 .003 .180 to .867 
n = 767, adjusted R square = .098, f = 42.615, p-value = 000. 
The difference in the percent of the number of people who believed knowledge sharing is important could 
have resulted from chance or from a relationship between compensation scheme and the belief that 
knowledge sharing is important. Therefore, we tested whether any of our manipulations affected 
participants’ beliefs about the importance of knowledge sharing. We found that paying to share knowledge 
and primary compensation affected those beliefs. Participants paid on a piece-rate basis for the primary 
work task were less likely to think that knowledge sharing is important than participants paid a fixed salary 
(19% versus 26%, p = .011). In addition, participants paid to share knowledge were more likely to think 
knowledge sharing is important than did those who were not paid to share knowledge (25% versus 20%, p 
= .034).  
We then investigated whether participants’ beliefs about the importance of knowledge sharing (KSI) 
mediated the effect of paying to share knowledge (PSK). We modeled KSI as a mediating variable for 
PSK when predicting the total amount of shared knowledge (TKS) for both salaried and piece-rate 
workers (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Mediation Model for KSI
For salaried workers, the paths from paying to share knowledge to belief that knowledge sharing is 
important, from paying to share knowledge to total amount of knowledge shared, and from belief that 
knowledge sharing is important to total amount of knowledge shared were all significant. Note, however, 
that, although the mediation effect was significant at the .02 level according to the Sobel test, the 
mediation was only partial and accounted for only a very small part of the relationship between PSK and 
TKS. In fact, the reduction in the coefficient from PSK to TKS (from 1.530 to 1.304) was only around 15 
percent. Consequently, our results concerning the individual and joint effects of PSK and KSI on TKS 
remain valid. 
For the piece-rate workers, the paths from paying to share knowledge to total amount of knowledge 
shared and from belief that knowledge sharing is important to total amount of knowledge shared were 
significant; however, the path from paying to share knowledge to belief that knowledge sharing is 
important was not. The Sobel test also shows that the mediation effect of KSI on PSK was not significant 
(p = .26). Thus, for piece-rate workers, our results suggest that being paid to share knowledge does not 
impact the belief that knowledge sharing is important.  
Because we constructed separate models for salaried and piece-rate workers, we did not need to 
construct a mediation model for the compensation scheme. However, as we note above, participants paid 
on a piece-rate basis for the primary work task were less likely to think that knowledge sharing is 
important than participants paid a fixed salary (19% versus 26%, p = .011). This finding supports the need 
to use a contingency approach that accounts for important contextual factors such as the primary 
compensation scheme when assessing the impact of managerial interventions designed to increase 
knowledge sharing.  
5 Discussion 
We conducted a controlled experiment to investigate the individual and joint effects on knowledge sharing 
of extrinsic incentives (being paid to share knowledge and presence of social feedback cues), internal 
belief about the importance of sharing knowledge, human moderators, and nature of the compensation 
scheme (salaried or piece-rate) for the primary work task. Table 5 summarizes our results. They contribute 
to both theory and practice and have various important implications for both theory and practice. 
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Table 5. Summary of Results
Hypotheses Result 
H1: Individuals who believe that sharing knowledge is important make more contributions to 
ESM than individuals who do not. Supported 
H2: The presence of social feedback cues that publically display reactions to contributions 
increase knowledge sharing in ESM. Not supported 
H3a: The presence of a supportive moderator increases knowledge sharing in ESM. Not supported 
H3b: The presence of a policing moderator decreases knowledge sharing in ESM. Not supported 
H4: People paid a fixed salary for their primary work task make more knowledge contributions 
using ESM than people paid on a piece-rate basis for their primary work task. Supported 
H5: Paying people to share knowledge using ESM increases the quantity of knowledge 
contributions for salaried workers but not for piece-rate workers. Supported 
H6a: For salaried workers, the combined effect of being paid to share knowledge and 
believing that knowledge sharing is important will be greater than the sum of the individual 
effects (i.e., there will be a positive synergistic effect).
Supported 
H6b: For piece-rate workers, the combined effect of being paid to share knowledge and 
believing that knowledge sharing is important will be less than the sum of the individual 
effects (i.e., there will be a negative synergistic effect). 
Not supported 
H7: The presence of a policing moderator undermines the effect of offering payments for 
knowledge sharing to salaried workers who believe knowledge sharing is important. Supported 
5.1 Contributions to Theory  
This research clarifies several issues about our understanding of using enterprise social media as 
knowledge-management systems. First, the belief that knowledge sharing is important led to increases in 
knowledge sharing across all experimental conditions. By itself, this finding supports other studies that 
have demonstrated that positive attitudes toward knowledge sharing play a central role in knowledge-
sharing outcomes in ESM (e.g., He & Wei, 2009; Lin, 2007; Mettler & Winter, 2015; Vuori & Okkonen, 
2012). To this existing knowledge, our results suggest that belief in the importance of knowledge sharing 
is more impactful for salaried workers than for piece-rate employees because employees who share the 
same internal motivations toward knowledge sharing at work act differently in the face of different financial 
incentive systems. Employees who are pre-disposed to share knowledge will do so but with less 
frequency when it hurts them financially. 
Another important contribution about belief in the importance of knowledge sharing is that this belief 
interacts with other interventions that employers use. Most saliently, a super-additive effect occurs when 
salaried workers with this belief receive payment for sharing knowledge. Although we did not specifically 
measure changes in intrinsic motivation, we believe that we can attribute the increase in knowledge-
sharing activity to the effects of “crowding in” intrinsic motivation. Salaried workers who were already 
positively inclined toward knowledge sharing experienced an incentive to do just that, and this 
complement to their motivation increased their sharing levels. Thus, we learn that crowding in is an 
important effect that occurs in the workplace and that future research should consider it. Scholars should 
view beliefs about knowledge sharing as a key component in knowledge-sharing studies that use ESM 
because of its individual impact and its inherent potential to be crowded in and enhanced by appropriate 
motivations. 
Another key area our research addresses concerns the impact of social factors on knowledge sharing. We 
found that neither a platform’s technical capability to allow for content feedback nor individuals’ expecting 
feedback on posted content increased knowledge sharing. This finding provides evidence that ESM is not 
the same as non-work social media (Facebook, Twitter) in which a sense of belonging, strong social ties, 
personal validation, and other similar social factors (see Chai & Kim, 2012; Lampe et al., 2006; Ma & 
Agarwal, 2007; Subrahmanyam et al., 2008) are normally considered the only drivers of knowledge 
sharing. Ellison et al. (2015) suggests that ESM differ from non-work social media based on dimensions 
that include their design, audience, and use goals. More specifically, they argue that corporations exert 
heavy influences over the social networks that they sponsor and that these influences affect their 
configurations, how they organize users, and the tasks that users focus on. Ellison et al. further argue that 
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ESM users could use the technology platforms for both individual affordances common to non-work social 
media (e.g., entertainment and relationship building) and organizational affordances (e.g., completing 
work-related tasks and goals), but that organizational affordances should dominate the platform use.  To 
these assertions, we add empirical evidence that work-related tasks do in fact dominate in ESM and 
further show that the very nature of a working environment changes the effectiveness—indeed, eliminates 
the effectiveness—of social factors as primary drivers of knowledge sharing. 
Financial incentives’ positive impact on knowledge contributions also represents a key finding from our 
research. Previously, researchers have found widely discrepant answers to whether financial incentives 
matter for knowledge sharing in ESM (Bock et al., 2005; Cabrera et al., 2006; He & Wei, 2009; 
Kankanhalli et al., 2005; Lin, 2007; Liu et al., 2011; Mettler & Winter, 2015; Vuori & Okkonen, 2012). We 
carefully designed our study to block out possible confounding factors and found that financial incentives, 
even trivially small ones, had a dramatic impact on participants’ knowledge-sharing activity. This finding 
resolves the debate about whether financial incentives increase knowledge sharing. Our research 
approach also highlights differences in prior studies that led to different results. Notably, studies that found 
increases in knowledge sharing attributable to monetary rewards collected data on actual observed 
behaviors, while those that did not find increases in knowledge sharing attributable to financial rewards 
tested attitudes toward knowledge sharing. Our findings support the reasoning that Liu et al. (2011) make 
that financial rewards favorably alter behaviors but not attitudes about knowledge sharing. 
To our knowledge, this study is the first to consider the impact of organizational controls in the ESM 
context. We contribute to theory in this space by demonstrating that a conspicuous form of knowledge 
policing (as opposed to support) offsets ideal conditions for knowledge sharing among salaried workers. 
We attribute the negative impact to a “crowding out” effect that occurs as a result of attempts to control 
human behavior through the threat of a penalty. Hence, when conditions that support both “crowding in” 
and “crowding out” exist simultaneously, the latter wins. We note that our policing moderators’ actions are 
associated specifically with imposing financial penalties for inappropriate knowledge contributions. In 
contrast, supportive moderators in our study could filter knowledge contributions but could not impose 
financial penalties. As such, monitoring does not measurably harm knowledge sharing, but threats of 
financial penalties will. Given that organizations need to control their knowledge assets, they should see 
good news in our finding that control is not always negative. Further, in their field studies, researchers will 
need to account for forms of organizational control of knowledge contributions that we now know to either 
be benign or hostile to knowledge-sharing activity. 
5.2 Managerial Implications  
Our findings have important implications for managers who might be considering interventions designed to 
increase knowledge sharing. In this section, we elaborate on which findings should be important to 
practitioners and why. We also suggest courses of action specific to those findings.  
Our results indicate that the internal belief that knowledge sharing is important is a critical factor that, in 
isolation, drives more knowledge sharing than any other factor and, in combination with other factors, 
determines their effectiveness. Thus, managers should take steps to foster this belief. Our results suggest 
that more than just encouraging employees to do something because they want them to do it, managers 
should instill a belief in employees that sharing knowledge is fundamentally the right thing for them to do.  
Consistent with prior research (Cabrera et al., 2006; Kankanhalli et al., 2005; Liu et al., 2011), we also 
found that offering financial incentives to share knowledge increased the number of contributions 
individuals made to a knowledge base. This effect occurred even though the size of the financial incentive 
was small compared to the rewards for performing the primary work task. The decision to pay workers to 
share knowledge is something over which managers have control.  
Interestingly, our analysis (see the last few paragraphs in Section 4) suggests that paying salaried 
workers to share knowledge increases both how much knowledge they share and the likelihood that they 
think knowledge sharing is important. Moreover, for salaried workers, the joint effect of being paid to share 
knowledge and believing that knowledge sharing is important is super-additive. Thus, at least for salaried 
workers, our results suggest the possibility of creating a “virtuous circle” where paying to share knowledge 
not only directly increases knowledge sharing but also indirectly does so by positively influencing attitudes 
about the importance of knowledge sharing (Garud & Kumaraswamy, 2005).  
Another important finding with practical application is that the payment scheme is an important contextual 
factor that either enhances or diminishes the likelihood that an individual will share knowledge. 
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Organizations should find this result interesting given that they often rely on sales people and their critical 
knowledge of customers to drive the majority of their income. Unfortunately, piece-rate payment schemes 
lower the effectiveness of other motivational factors and appear to limit knowledge sharing. Organizations 
can both increase the degree to which individuals believe in the importance of knowledge sharing and 
offer payments for doing so, although these strategies will not have as much impact without also altering 
the payment scheme. 
We also hypothesized and found evidence that adding the wrong managerial intervention to the mix can 
undo much of the synergistic effect of the combination of having salaried work, believing that knowledge 
sharing is important, and receiving payment for knowledge sharing. Specifically, for salaried workers, our 
results show a significant negative interaction between being paid to share knowledge, believing that 
knowledge sharing is important, and the presence of a policing moderator who monitors knowledge 
contributions and sanctions people who make inappropriate ones. This result occurred despite the fact 
that the perceived human moderators in our experiment did not actually apply any penalties to any 
participant. Thus, the mere threat of possible sanctions had a demotivating effect in that it reduced the 
number of knowledge contributions made by salaried workers who believed knowledge sharing is 
important and who received payment to share their knowledge. This finding agrees with prior research 
that has found that the threat of sanctions affects work output (Barkema, 1995; Fehr & Schmidt, 2007). 
Clearly, managers must think carefully about using such controls. When tone needs to police knowledge 
contributions, we suggest that one do so in as benign a manner as possible. Further, when one needs to 
intervene, we suggest one do so with discretion so as to not undermine the motivation of potential 
knowledge contributors. 
Our study also indicates that social features alone are insufficient to drive knowledge sharing via ESM. 
Therefore, managers should not assume that adopting a knowledge-management system with social 
features will solve previous problems with knowledge sharing. Managers need to focus on other factors, 
such as the ones we have demonstrated to be impactful, to make the platform effective. It is not as simple 
as setting up the platform and letting it manage itself: one needs to consciously manage the platform with 
appropriate incentives.  
In summary, our results suggest that no “silver bullet” for encouraging knowledge sharing exists.  
However, paying people to share knowledge helps, and so does the belief that knowledge sharing is 
important. Moreover, we found evidence for strong synergistic effects between paying people to share 
knowledge and the belief that knowledge sharing is important. However, managers need to adopt a 
contingency theory perspective when pondering how to increase knowledge sharing using enterprise 
social media. In some situations, adding a single extrinsic factor can have strong positive effects, but 
adding an additional extrinsic factor can undo those benefits.  
5.3 Limitations 
We used a controlled laboratory experiment to investigate the effect of various potential motivating 
incentives on knowledge sharing. In doing so, we could manipulate and rigorously test all possible 
combinations of treatments in a manner that would not be feasible in a field study. However, our controlled 
experiment looked at only the short-term effects of manipulations and lacked any significant career 
consequences (e.g., promotion or dismissal) that would exist in an organizational setting. Thus, future 
research should investigate how the presence of such additional long-term motivators might affect our 
results. 
The majority of participants in our study were under the age of 21. Some evidence shows that younger 
people and, in particular, those who grew up with the Internet and social media (digital natives) differ from 
people who did not have much or any exposure to those technologies until they became adults (digital 
immigrants) in how they respond to various attempts to influence their use of technology (Vodanovich, 
Sundaram, & Myers, 2010). Our results are valuable because they suggest how people who are currently 
entering the workforce will likely respond to various incentives to share knowledge. However, future 
research should investigate whether the factors we found to significantly influence knowledge sharing 
among young adults similarly influence older workers. 
6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, our study offers a deeper understanding about the complex interactions among the factors 
that impact knowledge sharing in ESM. Although some factors (e.g., paying to share knowledge and 
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believing that knowledge sharing is important) do have positive individual effects on the amount of 
knowledge sharing that occurs, interactions among these and other controllable factors are even more 
important. In particular, for people paid a fixed salary, we found a super-additive joint effect of being paid 
to share knowledge and believing that knowledge sharing is important. Therefore, instead of searching for 
a single “silver bullet” that will lead organizations to successfully implement knowledge-management 
systems based on ESM, our results suggest the need for IS researchers to systematically investigate the 
relative efficacy of different combinations of internal and extrinsic motivators for stimulating knowledge 
sharing. We believe that such an approach will eventually culminate in a well-articulated contingency 
model that managers can use to design appropriate combinations of incentives for knowledge sharing that 
best fit the culture and goals of their organizations. 
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Appendix A: Sequence of Pages as Seen During Experiment 
Figure A3. Community Profile Creation Page
 
 
Figure A2. Randomly Presented Treatment for Primary Work Task 
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Figure A3. Randomly Presented Treatment for Knowledge Sharing Task 
 
Figure A4. Treatment Recall Check Given Before Being Allowed to Begin Tasks 
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Figure A5. Page that all Participants Wait at Until Everyone Has Passed Treatment Recall Check
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Figure A6. Primary Work Task Page
 
Figure A7. Knowledge-sharing Website
 
 
Figure A8. Page that all Participants Wait at Until Everyone Has Clicked on the Exit Survey Link
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Figure A9. Post Experiment Survey
 
Figure A10. Post Experiment Survey Continued
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Appendix B: Experimental Script 
“Today I am conducting a voluntary study to learn more about knowledge sharing in business. The study 
asks you to do an online individual work task for 20 minutes and to record some of what you learn. In this 
study you earn ‘devil dollars’, which are similar to monopoly dollars, they aren’t redeemable for anything in 
the real world but they make the situation competitive so we can see who earns the most.” 
[Show screenshot of primary work task screen to participants] 
“You will go to a website and do an online information search with 5 different categories of questions. An 
example of a question is ‘What is Exxon’s Stock exchange symbol?” Do as many questions as you want, 
in any order. After 20 minutes I’ll ask you to write down how many you did.” 
[Show screenshot of community knowledge sharing site to participants] 
“If you use the community knowledge sharing site link, you can collaborate with others to help you do your 
work. You can write down anything on this site, ranging from urls to answers to questions. Collaborate as 
much or as little as you want to. Let me demonstrate.” 
[Demonstrate the following steps] 
“You will fill out a profile for the community site” [Fill in John, Doe, 36, Male, Information Systems]. 
“You will read compensation information about the individual work task.” [go to next page] 
“You will read a situation about the community knowledge sharing website.” [go to next page] 
“You will get a quiz to see if you remember the compensation and situation information you just read. If 
you don’t, you’ll have to read that information again” [go to next page] 
“Here is the individual work task you will be doing. On the left is a list of categories: Financial Questions, 
Technology Questions, History Questions, Biology Questions, People Questions.” [scroll page and point 
out category headings]. 
“Under Financial Questions I see the question: What is the stock exchange symbol for each of the 
following companies? If I select Exxon from this list, and type into a search engine ‘Exxon stock exchange 
symbol’[do task on google] , I see one place this answer is at is answers.com. I go there and see the 
answer is XOM. I write in my Worksheet ‘Exxon is XOM’. [do task.] Any questions about the individual 
work task?” 
“I may think that I now know something that will help others. I can click on the link for the community 
knowledge sharing site [point and click]. I see Financial Questions is a category. I click on it. I make a 
make a post to the community [post is ‘Title for your contribution’, ‘Contribution in the form of an answer to 
a question or the source for an answer’]. You can type in answers or sources of answers, whatever you 
think will help others. Any questions about the community knowledge sharing site? [take any questions]. 
Also, I can click on the link of the person’s name who submitted this brilliant post and see their profile 
[clicks].” 
“Please create a profile at knowledge.divinememory.com, read the instructions, and then wait for me to 
give you a code to start.” 
[Wait for everyone to pass check] 
[Click Timer Start in knowledge.divinememory.com/dadmin] 
[Show start code on screen] 
“You have 20 minutes to spend your time however you like on the individual work task and the community 
knowledge sharing site. This is the start code, 4321.” 
[When 20 minutes are up] 
“Time is up. Please count how many individual work items you completed” [30 seconds wait]. Ask “Does 
everyone have a count of their work items? Click on the community site link, then click on the exit survey 
link in the navigation bar.”  
[Show survey code on screen] 
[When surveys are completed, read debriefing script] 
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“Thank you for participating in this study. The motivation behind this study is that organizations are 
interested in why some employees share knowledge in their private social networking websites and why 
some don’t. Two examples of these are Cisco and Deloitte, who have huge communities for their 
organizations, but some groups of employees don’t seem to share information about their jobs. 
The task you performed was of secondary interest to the level of knowledge sharing that you did in the 
community. In this study, each of you read scenarios that described different types of pay, social website 
features, and the possibility of having your content monitored by a human being. At this point I will 
disclose two items that you were not informed of at the beginning. The first is that the postings you saw 
showing up in the community forum were not entered by students but rather by the computer, that way the 
amount of knowledge entered in was limited to a small quantity and you wouldn’t feel that all of the useful 
information had already been posted. The other item to disclose is that, although the written scenario said 
that a human being would review your contributions for quality, that was not the case. The reason for 
saying this was to determine if an awareness of the potential review of your knowledge contributions by a 
manager would affect the likelihood of sharing knowledge. This is question important to business 
research. Are there any questions I can answer at this time about anything related to the study?”
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Appendix C: Treatment Levels and Wording 
During the experiment, we asked the participants to view a webpage (the treatment page) that explained 
the compensation and rules for study participation. The experimental subject would randomly see one of 
24 combinations of written scenarios. We created those combinations as follows: one combination of 
financial incentives (4 levels), one type of human control (3 levels), and one type of social incentive (2 
levels). We presented these levels to the subjects as follows: 
Compensation treatment level 1: salaried with no financial incentive for knowledge sharing: “Using the 
questions on the individual work task worksheet, you will be paid 30 Devil Dollars if you record one or 
more answers in the large text box on the right side of that page. The amount you are paid does not 
increase as you put more answers in the text box.”  
 “You are encouraged to post items for others in the community knowledge sharing site, but you WILL 
NOT be paid extra for it.” 
Compensation treatment level 2 (salaried plus financial incentive for knowledge sharing): “Using 
the questions on the individual work task worksheet, you will be paid 30 Devil Dollars if you record one or 
more answers in the large text box on the right side of that page. The amount you are paid does not 
increase as you put more answers in the text box.”  
 “You are encouraged to post items for others in the community knowledge sharing site, and you WILL be 
paid an extra 0.25 Devil Dollars (25 cents) if you post one or more items in the community knowledge 
sharing site. This amount does not increase as you post more items in the community site.” 
Compensation treatment level 3 (piece-rate with no financial incentive for knowledge sharing): 
“Using the questions on the individual work task worksheet, you will be paid one Devil Dollar for each 
answer to a question that you record in the large text box on the right side of that page.”  
 “You are encouraged to post items for others in the community knowledge sharing site, but you WILL 
NOT be paid extra for it.” 
Compensation treatment level 4 (piece-rate plus financial incentive for knowledge sharing): “Using 
the questions on the individual work task worksheet, you will be paid one Devil Dollar for each answer to a 
question that you record in the large text box on the right side of that page.”  
 “You are encouraged to post items for others in the community knowledge sharing site, and you WILL be 
paid an extra 0.01 Devil Dollars (one cent) for each item you post in the community knowledge sharing 
site.” 
Social features treatment level 1 (none): “Other contributors ARE NOT able to leave comments on your 
posted items in the community knowledge sharing site. If you post an item there, other contributors WILL 
NOT be able to comment on it.”  
Social features treatment level 2 (social features present): “Other contributors ARE able to leave 
comments on your posted items in the community knowledge sharing site. If you post an item there, other 
contributors WILL be able to comment on it.” 
Subjects receiving the social features treatment level 2 saw commenting enabled and page view counts 
visible in the community website. At 5, 10, and 15 minutes, the following activity happened in the 
knowledge sharing website:  
1. Page view counts that are next to knowledge postings made by the subject (if any) were 
increased by 15 views (making it appear that others were looking at their posts). 
2. The most recent contribution they had made (if any) got a positive written comment such as 
“Thanks, that was helpful” at the 5 minute mark, “You post good information” at the 10 minute 
mark, and “You’re better at this than I am” at the 15 minute mark.” Human Control Treatment 
Level 1 (none): “Items that contributors post in the community knowledge sharing site ARE 
NOT reviewed by the site manager.” 
Human control treatment level 2 (supportive moderator): “Items that contributors post in the 
community knowledge sharing site ARE reviewed by the site manager. If the site manager identifies a 
problem with a posted item, such as being inappropriate, low quality, or incorrect, he/she WILL help you 
fix the problem. The site manager WILL NOT take away any of your earned Devil Dollars.” 
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Human control treatment level 3 (policing moderator): “Items that contributors post in the community 
knowledge sharing site ARE reviewed by the site manager. If the site manager identifies a problem with a 
posted item, such as being inappropriate, offensive, illegal, or confidential, he/she WILL NOT help you fix 
the problem. Instead, the site manager will remove the posted item with the problem, and WILL take away 
one of your earned Devil Dollars for each posted item that is removed.” 
672 
An Experimental Investigation of the Individual and Joint Effects of Financial and Non-financial Incentives on 
Knowledge Sharing Using Enterprise Social Media
 
Volume 41   Paper 27  
 
Appendix D: Treatment Levels and Wording 
“For each choice below, select the statement that best describes the work scenario you read:” 
Manipulation checks for financial incentives: 
 The amount I am paid DOES NOT increase as I put more answers in the individual work task 
worksheet (after the first item) 
 The amount I am paid DOES increase as I put more answers in the individual work task 
worksheet 
 I AM paid extra for posting items in the community knowledge sharing site 
 I AM NOT paid extra for posting items in the community knowledge sharing site 
Manipulation check for social incentives: 
 Other contributors ARE able to leave comments on my posted items in the community 
knowledge sharing site  
 Other contributors ARE NOT able to leave comments on my posted items in the community 
knowledge sharing site  
Manipulation check for human moderator: 
 Items that I post in the community knowledge sharing site ARE NOT reviewed by the site 
manager. 
 Items that I post in the community knowledge sharing site ARE reviewed by a site manager. If 
the site manager identifies a problem with a posted item, such as being inappropriate, low 
quality, or incorrect, he/she WILL help me fix the problem. The site manager WILL NOT take 
away any of my earned Devil Dollars. 
 Items that I post in the community knowledge sharing site ARE reviewed by a site manager. If 
the site manager identifies a problem with a posted item, such as being inappropriate, 
offensive, illegal, or confidential, he/she WILL NOT help me fix the problem. Instead, the site 
manager will remove the posted item with the problem, and WILL take away one of my earned 
Devil Dollars for each posted item that is removed. 
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